|
|
58A Governor-General of Parliament - duties, rights and powers |
 |
|
|
Proposed Constitution |
|
There shall be a Governor-General of Parliament, referred to as the Governor-General, who shall act as the Head of State of the Commonwealth of Australia exercising only the duties, rights and powers which are set out in this Constitution, including:
(i) The duty to convene and the right to preside over sessions of the House of Representatives in accordance with such standing orders as are made pursuant to section 50 and the requirements of impartiality and fairness;
(ii) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with section 64A;
(iii) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and commence the process for a general election of members of the House, but only upon, and within 10 days of:
(a) The House of Representatives passing a resolution in favour of a dissolution;
(b) The House of Representatives failing to appoint a new Prime Minister within 60 days after the declaration of all the results of a general election or the removal of the Prime Minister under section 58A(ii); or
(c) The High Court, on the application by the Head of State or any elector, declaring that the House has sat for longer than the period permitted by section 28;
(iv) The duty to commence the process for the election of a new member to fill any vacancy in the House of Representatives in accordance with any request made by the Prime Minister, subject to any contrary resolution of the House of Representatives passed prior to the commencement of the process;
(v) The power to exercise any duty, right or power vested in the Deputy Governor-General, during any period in which that office is vacant, or the Deputy Governor-General is absent or otherwise unable to exercise the duty, right or power;
(vi) Powers incidental to the exercise of the above duties, rights and powers;
(vii) Such other powers in relation to the management of the House of Representatives as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by the House’s Standing Orders; and
(viii) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by law.
A reference to a resolution passed by the House of Representatives means a resolution on which a majority of those who vote on the resolution cast a vote in favour of the resolution.
< Previous section Next section > |
All Changes Displayed |
|
There shall be a Governor-General of Parliament, referred to as the Governor-General, who shall act as the Head of State of the Commonwealth of Australia exercising only the duties, rights and powers which are set out in this Constitution, including:
(i) The duty to convene and the right to preside over sessions of the House of Representatives in accordance with such standing orders as are made pursuant to section 50 and the requirements of impartiality and fairness;
(ii) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with section 64A;
(iii) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and commence the process for a general election of members of the House, but only upon, and within 10 days of:
(a) The House of Representatives passing a resolution in favour of a dissolution;
(b) The House of Representatives failing to appoint a new Prime Minister within 60 days after the declaration of all the results of a general election or the removal of the Prime Minister under section 58A(ii); or
(c) The High Court, on the application by the Head of State or any elector, declaring that the House has sat for longer than the period permitted by section 28;
(iv) The duty to commence the process for the election of a new member to fill any vacancy in the House of Representatives in accordance with any request made by the Prime Minister, subject to any contrary resolution of the House of Representatives passed prior to the commencement of the process;
(v) The power to exercise any duty, right or power vested in the Deputy Governor-General, during any period in which that office is vacant, or the Deputy Governor-General is absent or otherwise unable to exercise the duty, right or power;
(vi) Powers incidental to the exercise of the above duties, rights and powers;
(vii) Such other powers in relation to the management of the House of Representatives as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by the House’s Standing Orders; and
(viii) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by law.
A reference to a resolution passed by the House of Representatives means a resolution on which a majority of those who vote on the resolution cast a vote in favour of the resolution. |
Drafting Notes |
|
58A.1 This section re-constitutes the Governor-General as the Governor-General of Parliament and as Australia’s Head of State instead of the Queen.
58A.2 The Governor-General has “only” the duties, rights and powers which are set out in the Constitution. The Constitution will be the sole point of reference defining what the Head of State may and may not do, unless:
▸ The House of Representatives through its Standing Orders requires the Governor-General to manage the administration of the House; or
▸ Parliament passes legislation conferring additional powers on the Governor-General.
The word “only” therefore contributes to the abolition of several current concepts:
▸ It will no longer be possible to argue that the Governor-General has reserve powers, or prerogative powers formerly held by British royalty, or that those powers influence how the powers stated in the Constitution should be exercised.
▸ Nor will it be possible to argue the Governor-General has implied powers by reason of his or her position. Over time some may wish to argue that other powers can be implied from the text of the Constitution. The purpose of the “incidental” power under proposed s.58A(vi) is to make such implications unnecessary.
▸ The Governor-General will no longer act on the advice of his or her ministers. That concept was developed to bring Royal power under democratic control. There will no longer be any Royal power, and the constraints on the Governor-General’s powers will be clear from the Constitution itself.
58A.3 The functions of the Head of State have been divided into duties, rights and powers. This has a practical effect which is set out in s.60A. The Head of State may be required by Court order to fulfill the duties. A person dissatisfied with the Governor-General's exercise of the rights could seek a declaration that they have not been validly exercised. The Head of State could himself or herself take court action to vindicate his or her entitlement to take the actions classed as rights. With the limited exception of powers incidental to the exercise of duties, the Head of State cannot be forced to exercise a mere power, but the grant of power permits the Head of State to take the action. The main mere power is the power to act in place of the Deputy. The exercise of this power is intended to be a matter for the discretion of the Governor-General. The only other mere powers are those conferred by standing orders or legislation. If the Governor-General declines to exercise the former, changing the standing orders is a better remedy than court action. Whether powers conferred by legislation may be the subject of court proceedings will be stated in the legislation itself.
58A.4 Although the standing orders of each House will now determine when Parliament meets - see s.6A - subsection 58A(i) imposes a duty on the Governor-General to convene such sessions as are required. The Governor-General will not be able to prevent a House from meeting, as is possible at present.
58A.5 Although the Governor-General’s main job will be chairing debates in the House of Representatives, the word “right” to preside has been chosen over “duty” because:
▸ It is unlikely the Governor-General will need to be forced to chair debates - if he or she becomes reluctant, permanent replacement is the more appropriate remedy;
▸ There may be occasions when it is advisable for the Governor-General to be elsewhere - for example, he or she may in the Deputy’s absence choose to chair an important debate in the Senate rather than an unimportant debate in the House; and
▸ The Governor-General should not be subject to court action to enforce fulfillment of the duty when he or she may be suffering ill-health.
58A.6 The Governor-General’s right to preside is qualified by the words “impartiality and fairness”. The right is not validly exercised if rulings are partial or unfair. Such conduct may be challenged under s.60A(3).
58A.7 Subsection 58A(ii), together with s.64A, is one of the main provisions in the Advancing Democracy model. The combined effect of the sections is that a future Governor-General could not remove a Prime Minister with majority support in the House and replace him or her with the leader of the minority opposition as Sir John Kerr did in 1975. If the Governor-General did so, his or her decision could be immediately reversed through court action under s.60A(3). The sections also place the power of appointment of the Deputy Prime Minister in the hands of the House of Representatives, rather than in the hands of the Prime Minister, who will appoint all other Ministers pursuant to s.64A. This is appropriate because the Deputy will be the immediate replacement Prime Minister if the Prime Minister dies or resigns.
58A.8 Subsection 58A(iii) specifies three circumstances only in which the Governor-General has a duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and call an election. There is no right or power to do this. If one of the three circumstances applies, a dissolution must occur. If not, a dissolution by the Governor-General would be unconstitutional, and the High Court could declare it invalid under s.60A(3). Of the three circumstances:
▸ The first places the power to call an early election with the House of Representatives, rather than the Prime Minister;
▸ The second forces the House to choose a new Government within 60 days of an election or Prime Ministerial death, resignation or removal, otherwise it must face another election; and
▸ The third merely provides a mechanism to remedy any failure by the House to call a new election before its term expires.
Under this clause, it would be impossible for a Governor-General to force an unwanted dissolution on a Government in the way Sir John Kerr did in 1975. As the power is classed as a duty, the Governor-General could not refuse a dissolution when the House had decided there should be an early election.
58A.9 There are several statements from High Court judges and constitutional writers which assert that, under our present Constitution, an election cannot be cancelled or prevented by court action once the House of Representatives has been dissolved by the Governor-General. This would change under proposed s.58A(iii). It will be clear whether or not a dissolution breaches the section, and if so the High Court should stay the election process then cancel it by injunction under s.75(v).
58A.10 Subsection 58A(iv) deals with by-elections. Here a greater role for the Prime Minister is conceded, but the House may still overrule the Prime Minister by passing a contrary resolution before implementation of the Prime Minister’s request for a by-election has commenced. This goes some way to ensuring that a by-election is not delayed for Government advantage unless the whole House agrees to that course of action.
58A.11 The intention behind subsection 58A(v) and its counterpart, s.59A(ii), is that the Governor-General and Deputy can freely fill in for each other when one of them is unavailable, without the Governor-General ceding his or her position to the Deputy.
58A.12 Subsection 58A(vi) is intended to negate any suggestion of implied powers beyond incidental powers. Incidental powers are really a subset of all possible implied powers. Whereas an implied power may cover any subject, an incidental power is an implied power which assists in the exercise of one of the stated subjects of an express power. By way of example:
▸ If it were not for s.58A(vi) and the word “only” in the opening line of s.58A, it would be possible to imply from the Governor-General’s role as Head of State that he or she has the authority to communicate and meet with other Heads of State. Upon implementation of the Advancing Democracy model, the Governor-General would not have this power, as this is not one of the subjects on which he or she is given power in the Constitution and it is not “incidental” to any of the other powers in s.58A. The conduct of relations with other countries has always been a matter for the Government, and the Governor-General will no longer have any role, formal or otherwise, in Government. If Parliament wants the Governor-General to have a diplomatic role, it may pass legislation under s.58A(viii). Hopefully it will not do so.
▸ The Governor-General is not given a power to liaise with members of the House of Representatives about the formation of a Government. Ordinarily, such discussions would not be necessary, because s.64A requires Governments to be formed in accordance with a resolution by the majority of the House of Representatives. However, if the House is not sitting when a Prime Minister dies or resigns, s.64A allows the Governor-General to form his or her own opinion on who the House is likely to support and appoint that person. To form that opinion, the Governor-General may need to discuss the issue with members of the House. The power to conduct such discussions and negotiations is therefore incidental to the Governor-General’s powers in s.58A(ii).
▸ The present Governor-General is the patron of a large number of not-for-profit organisations. This role is not incidental to any of the express powers vested in the Governor-General of Parliament, so he or she could not continue such patronage.
58A.13 The language describing incidental powers follows that of s.51(xxxix) so as to ensure conformity in the interpretation of the two sections.
58A.14 Subsection 58A(vii) permits the House to give the Governor-General a role in managing the House of Representatives. This needs to be considered in the context of the Speaker’s current role.
58A.14.1 Parliamentary staff are generally not part of the Commonwealth Public Service. They belong to a separate Australian Parliamentary Service, which is divided into 3 departments: the Department of the House of Representatives, presided over by the Clerk of the House, the Department of the Senate, presided over by the Clerk of the Senate, and the Parliamentary Library: s.9, Parliamentary Service Act 1999. The Clerk is the supervisor of the House’s staff (of 158 officers, according to the 2010-2011 Annual Report, p.4). The Parliamentary service is independent of the Government: s.10(1)(a).
58A.14.2 The Speaker of the House of Representatives appoints the Clerk - s.58(2) - and has limited powers to give directions to the Clerk of the House: s.20(1), s.19.
58A.14.3 Whether, and to what extent, the Governor-General should take over the current speaker’s role in relation to the Clerk, or some greater or lesser version of that role, is a matter on which opinions may differ over time. Subsection 58A(vii) permits the House to determine in its standing orders which, if any, of these roles the Governor-General will perform. This and the next subsection build flexibility into the position. If Parliament wants to allocate more duties to the Governor-General by legislation under subsection 58A(viii), it could simultaneously lighten the Governor-General’s workload by relieving him or her of administrative responsibilities in the House of Representatives.
58A.15 Subsection 58A(viii) permits Parliament to confer other powers on the Governor-General through legislation. Without legislation, the Governor-General would not be able to continue to play a diplomatic role, administer the honours system, act as patron to organisations, roam around the country attending functions, support causes or generally squander taxpayers' funds as currently occurs. This is intentional. The new role for the Governor-General will not be like the old role. There should be a clean break with the past. About the only additional function which is consistent with the strict impartiality of the position is as an ambassador for democracy within Australia, explaining to the people how our system of Government works and encouraging constructive participation in politics. That would be a truly useful contribution. |
Proposed Constitution |
|
There shall be a Governor-General of Parliament, referred to as the Governor-General, who shall act as the Head of State of the Commonwealth of Australia exercising only the duties, rights and powers which are set out in this Constitution, including:
(i) The duty to convene and the right to preside over sessions of the House of Representatives in accordance with such standing orders as are made pursuant to section 50 and the requirements of impartiality and fairness;
(ii) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with section 64A;
(iii) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and commence the process for a general election of members of the House, but only upon, and within 10 days of:
(a) The House of Representatives passing a resolution in favour of a dissolution;
(b) The House of Representatives failing to appoint a new Prime Minister within 60 days after the declaration of all the results of a general election or the removal of the Prime Minister under section 58A(ii); or
(c) The High Court, on the application by the Head of State or any elector, declaring that the House has sat for longer than the period permitted by section 28;
(iv) The duty to commence the process for the election of a new member to fill any vacancy in the House of Representatives in accordance with any request made by the Prime Minister, subject to any contrary resolution of the House of Representatives passed prior to the commencement of the process;
(v) The power to exercise any duty, right or power vested in the Deputy Governor-General, during any period in which that office is vacant, or the Deputy Governor-General is absent or otherwise unable to exercise the duty, right or power;
(vi) Powers incidental to the exercise of the above duties, rights and powers;
(vii) Such other powers in relation to the management of the House of Representatives as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by the House’s Standing Orders; and
(viii) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by law.
A reference to a resolution passed by the House of Representatives means a resolution on which a majority of those who vote on the resolution cast a vote in favour of the resolution.
< Previous section Next section > |
All Changes Displayed |
|
There shall be a Governor-General of Parliament, referred to as the Governor-General, who shall act as the Head of State of the Commonwealth of Australia exercising only the duties, rights and powers which are set out in this Constitution, including:
(i) The duty to convene and the right to preside over sessions of the House of Representatives in accordance with such standing orders as are made pursuant to section 50 and the requirements of impartiality and fairness;
(ii) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister in accordance with section 64A;
(iii) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and commence the process for a general election of members of the House, but only upon, and within 10 days of:
(a) The House of Representatives passing a resolution in favour of a dissolution;
(b) The House of Representatives failing to appoint a new Prime Minister within 60 days after the declaration of all the results of a general election or the removal of the Prime Minister under section 58A(ii); or
(c) The High Court, on the application by the Head of State or any elector, declaring that the House has sat for longer than the period permitted by section 28;
(iv) The duty to commence the process for the election of a new member to fill any vacancy in the House of Representatives in accordance with any request made by the Prime Minister, subject to any contrary resolution of the House of Representatives passed prior to the commencement of the process;
(v) The power to exercise any duty, right or power vested in the Deputy Governor-General, during any period in which that office is vacant, or the Deputy Governor-General is absent or otherwise unable to exercise the duty, right or power;
(vi) Powers incidental to the exercise of the above duties, rights and powers;
(vii) Such other powers in relation to the management of the House of Representatives as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by the House’s Standing Orders; and
(viii) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are from time to time conferred on the Governor-General by law.
A reference to a resolution passed by the House of Representatives means a resolution on which a majority of those who vote on the resolution cast a vote in favour of the resolution. |
Drafting Notes |
|
58A.1 This section re-constitutes the Governor-General as the Governor-General of Parliament and as Australia’s Head of State instead of the Queen.
58A.2 The Governor-General has “only” the duties, rights and powers which are set out in the Constitution. The Constitution will be the sole point of reference defining what the Head of State may and may not do, unless:
▸ The House of Representatives through its Standing Orders requires the Governor-General to manage the administration of the House; or
▸ Parliament passes legislation conferring additional powers on the Governor-General.
The word “only” therefore contributes to the abolition of several current concepts:
▸ It will no longer be possible to argue that the Governor-General has reserve powers, or prerogative powers formerly held by British royalty, or that those powers influence how the powers stated in the Constitution should be exercised.
▸ Nor will it be possible to argue the Governor-General has implied powers by reason of his or her position. Over time some may wish to argue that other powers can be implied from the text of the Constitution. The purpose of the “incidental” power under proposed s.58A(vi) is to make such implications unnecessary.
▸ The Governor-General will no longer act on the advice of his or her ministers. That concept was developed to bring Royal power under democratic control. There will no longer be any Royal power, and the constraints on the Governor-General’s powers will be clear from the Constitution itself.
58A.3 The functions of the Head of State have been divided into duties, rights and powers. This has a practical effect which is set out in s.60A. The Head of State may be required by Court order to fulfill the duties. A person dissatisfied with the Governor-General's exercise of the rights could seek a declaration that they have not been validly exercised. The Head of State could himself or herself take court action to vindicate his or her entitlement to take the actions classed as rights. With the limited exception of powers incidental to the exercise of duties, the Head of State cannot be forced to exercise a mere power, but the grant of power permits the Head of State to take the action. The main mere power is the power to act in place of the Deputy. The exercise of this power is intended to be a matter for the discretion of the Governor-General. The only other mere powers are those conferred by standing orders or legislation. If the Governor-General declines to exercise the former, changing the standing orders is a better remedy than court action. Whether powers conferred by legislation may be the subject of court proceedings will be stated in the legislation itself.
58A.4 Although the standing orders of each House will now determine when Parliament meets - see s.6A - subsection 58A(i) imposes a duty on the Governor-General to convene such sessions as are required. The Governor-General will not be able to prevent a House from meeting, as is possible at present.
58A.5 Although the Governor-General’s main job will be chairing debates in the House of Representatives, the word “right” to preside has been chosen over “duty” because:
▸ It is unlikely the Governor-General will need to be forced to chair debates - if he or she becomes reluctant, permanent replacement is the more appropriate remedy;
▸ There may be occasions when it is advisable for the Governor-General to be elsewhere - for example, he or she may in the Deputy’s absence choose to chair an important debate in the Senate rather than an unimportant debate in the House; and
▸ The Governor-General should not be subject to court action to enforce fulfillment of the duty when he or she may be suffering ill-health.
58A.6 The Governor-General’s right to preside is qualified by the words “impartiality and fairness”. The right is not validly exercised if rulings are partial or unfair. Such conduct may be challenged under s.60A(3).
58A.7 Subsection 58A(ii), together with s.64A, is one of the main provisions in the Advancing Democracy model. The combined effect of the sections is that a future Governor-General could not remove a Prime Minister with majority support in the House and replace him or her with the leader of the minority opposition as Sir John Kerr did in 1975. If the Governor-General did so, his or her decision could be immediately reversed through court action under s.60A(3). The sections also place the power of appointment of the Deputy Prime Minister in the hands of the House of Representatives, rather than in the hands of the Prime Minister, who will appoint all other Ministers pursuant to s.64A. This is appropriate because the Deputy will be the immediate replacement Prime Minister if the Prime Minister dies or resigns.
58A.8 Subsection 58A(iii) specifies three circumstances only in which the Governor-General has a duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and call an election. There is no right or power to do this. If one of the three circumstances applies, a dissolution must occur. If not, a dissolution by the Governor-General would be unconstitutional, and the High Court could declare it invalid under s.60A(3). Of the three circumstances:
▸ The first places the power to call an early election with the House of Representatives, rather than the Prime Minister;
▸ The second forces the House to choose a new Government within 60 days of an election or Prime Ministerial death, resignation or removal, otherwise it must face another election; and
▸ The third merely provides a mechanism to remedy any failure by the House to call a new election before its term expires.
Under this clause, it would be impossible for a Governor-General to force an unwanted dissolution on a Government in the way Sir John Kerr did in 1975. As the power is classed as a duty, the Governor-General could not refuse a dissolution when the House had decided there should be an early election.
58A.9 There are several statements from High Court judges and constitutional writers which assert that, under our present Constitution, an election cannot be cancelled or prevented by court action once the House of Representatives has been dissolved by the Governor-General. This would change under proposed s.58A(iii). It will be clear whether or not a dissolution breaches the section, and if so the High Court should stay the election process then cancel it by injunction under s.75(v).
58A.10 Subsection 58A(iv) deals with by-elections. Here a greater role for the Prime Minister is conceded, but the House may still overrule the Prime Minister by passing a contrary resolution before implementation of the Prime Minister’s request for a by-election has commenced. This goes some way to ensuring that a by-election is not delayed for Government advantage unless the whole House agrees to that course of action.
58A.11 The intention behind subsection 58A(v) and its counterpart, s.59A(ii), is that the Governor-General and Deputy can freely fill in for each other when one of them is unavailable, without the Governor-General ceding his or her position to the Deputy.
58A.12 Subsection 58A(vi) is intended to negate any suggestion of implied powers beyond incidental powers. Incidental powers are really a subset of all possible implied powers. Whereas an implied power may cover any subject, an incidental power is an implied power which assists in the exercise of one of the stated subjects of an express power. By way of example:
▸ If it were not for s.58A(vi) and the word “only” in the opening line of s.58A, it would be possible to imply from the Governor-General’s role as Head of State that he or she has the authority to communicate and meet with other Heads of State. Upon implementation of the Advancing Democracy model, the Governor-General would not have this power, as this is not one of the subjects on which he or she is given power in the Constitution and it is not “incidental” to any of the other powers in s.58A. The conduct of relations with other countries has always been a matter for the Government, and the Governor-General will no longer have any role, formal or otherwise, in Government. If Parliament wants the Governor-General to have a diplomatic role, it may pass legislation under s.58A(viii). Hopefully it will not do so.
▸ The Governor-General is not given a power to liaise with members of the House of Representatives about the formation of a Government. Ordinarily, such discussions would not be necessary, because s.64A requires Governments to be formed in accordance with a resolution by the majority of the House of Representatives. However, if the House is not sitting when a Prime Minister dies or resigns, s.64A allows the Governor-General to form his or her own opinion on who the House is likely to support and appoint that person. To form that opinion, the Governor-General may need to discuss the issue with members of the House. The power to conduct such discussions and negotiations is therefore incidental to the Governor-General’s powers in s.58A(ii).
▸ The present Governor-General is the patron of a large number of not-for-profit organisations. This role is not incidental to any of the express powers vested in the Governor-General of Parliament, so he or she could not continue such patronage.
58A.13 The language describing incidental powers follows that of s.51(xxxix) so as to ensure conformity in the interpretation of the two sections.
58A.14 Subsection 58A(vii) permits the House to give the Governor-General a role in managing the House of Representatives. This needs to be considered in the context of the Speaker’s current role.
58A.14.1 Parliamentary staff are generally not part of the Commonwealth Public Service. They belong to a separate Australian Parliamentary Service, which is divided into 3 departments: the Department of the House of Representatives, presided over by the Clerk of the House, the Department of the Senate, presided over by the Clerk of the Senate, and the Parliamentary Library: s.9, Parliamentary Service Act 1999. The Clerk is the supervisor of the House’s staff (of 158 officers, according to the 2010-2011 Annual Report, p.4). The Parliamentary service is independent of the Government: s.10(1)(a).
58A.14.2 The Speaker of the House of Representatives appoints the Clerk - s.58(2) - and has limited powers to give directions to the Clerk of the House: s.20(1), s.19.
58A.14.3 Whether, and to what extent, the Governor-General should take over the current speaker’s role in relation to the Clerk, or some greater or lesser version of that role, is a matter on which opinions may differ over time. Subsection 58A(vii) permits the House to determine in its standing orders which, if any, of these roles the Governor-General will perform. This and the next subsection build flexibility into the position. If Parliament wants to allocate more duties to the Governor-General by legislation under subsection 58A(viii), it could simultaneously lighten the Governor-General’s workload by relieving him or her of administrative responsibilities in the House of Representatives.
58A.15 Subsection 58A(viii) permits Parliament to confer other powers on the Governor-General through legislation. Without legislation, the Governor-General would not be able to continue to play a diplomatic role, administer the honours system, act as patron to organisations, roam around the country attending functions, support causes or generally squander taxpayers' funds as currently occurs. This is intentional. The new role for the Governor-General will not be like the old role. There should be a clean break with the past. About the only additional function which is consistent with the strict impartiality of the position is as an ambassador for democracy within Australia, explaining to the people how our system of Government works and encouraging constructive participation in politics. That would be a truly useful contribution. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|