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Chapter 1 - Why We Should Change Now |
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Chapter 1 - Why We Should Change Now
Australia should vote on a new proposal to reform the Commonwealth Constitution.
Our Constitution has major flaws. Its failure to guarantee democracy threatens the stability of our political system. We need a system resilient enough to deal with polarising issues such as climate change and refugees. Without change, our system is vulnerable.
The Advancing Democracy proposal aims to strengthen the Constitution through far-reaching changes which replace the monarchy with democratic principle, because the Crown is the main source of instability.
People like to believe that the Constitution has served us well in the past. Why should we fix it, if it isn’t broken? Even if you accept that erroneous view, it is simply negligent to do nothing. Your home may not be 'broken', but it will collapse eventually if you neglect the maintenance. Similarly, a Constitution which is not adapted to changing circumstances will fail when you most need it.
Our Constitution was built on a foundation which has been crumbling for years: the monarchy. It should have been based on the twin pillars of democracy and federalism. Instead, a third pillar - monarchy - dominates the text of the Constitution.
A Constitution is a set of rules for Government. The first requirement for any set of rules is that they be clear - everyone should know which rules apply and what they mean. Australia’s Constitution fails this basic test. Its great flaw is that it actually provides for two sets of rules, with one set contradicting the other. The written rules grant extensive powers to the Queen and her representative, the Governor-General, while in practice unwritten rules require these powers to be exercised by, or in accordance with the wishes of, the majority of our elected representatives.
Few members of the public understand just how vulnerable our system is. The people expect:
▸ That the party which wins a majority in the House of Representatives will form the Government,
▸ That the Government will govern, and
▸ That our elected representatives will decide what our laws will be.
These important rules are the essence of democracy. Yet they are all rules of practice - conventions of the Constitution. None of them appears in the written Constitution. Our Constitution allows these democratic rules to operate, but it does not guarantee that they will, and in fact it permits each of these rules to be broken. Either of two opposite results - democratic rule or undemocratic rule - is perfectly legal under our Constitution.
Australia has been fortunate. In all but one of the few political crises we have faced, our politicians have found it expedient or advantageous or appropriate to resolve the conflict by following the democratic unwritten rules. Disputes in 1916-17 (over conscription), 1931-32 (the depression), 1939-1940 (war-time defence) and 1949-51 (post-war reconstruction) are examples of highly contentious issues which were resolved by public support shifting decisively between political groups before the contradictions in the Constitution became apparent. That is why our Constitution appears to have worked well - underlying these disputes was a consensus about how the disputes should be resolved.
But sooner or later we will face a crisis where it suits one side to play by the rules as they’ve operated in practice, while it suits the other side to play by the quite different rules in the written Constitution. When this occurred in 1975 our system was seriously damaged. If it happens again, the system may well fracture, because there will be no consensus on how to resolve a serious political dispute.
The political climate since early 2010 has been very reminiscent of that of the mid 1970s. Many sections of society are in the sort of ugly, combative mood in which emotion overrides reason, and different opinions are barely tolerated. We are again approaching a time when it may suit one side to play by the written rules, instead of the unwritten rules.
Only this time it is the progressive side of politics which may find it advantageous to ignore the democratic rules.
Consider the controversy over the carbon tax. We now have a carbon tax, and a new Liberal Government pledged to remove it. Until 30th June 2014, that Government faces a hostile Senate, dominated by the Greens and Labor.
What would happen if the Senate refused to pass the 2014 budget unless the new Government reversed its stance on the carbon tax? This is a variation of what a conservative Senate did to the Whitlam Government in 1975. The tactic worked then. The Governor-General dismissed the Whitlam Government, even though it held a clear majority in the House of Representatives. Would the Governor-General dismiss an Abbott Government because it could not guarantee supply? There is a clear precedent for doing so.
Alternatively, the Liberals may, after 30th June, pass the legislation to repeal the tax. But it could not become law until the Governor-General assents to the legislation, and section 58 of the Constitution permits assent to be withheld. Would the Governor-General assent? It depends on who the Governor-General is. What if the incumbent had been replaced before the election by a pro-Green nominee, or if a new Governor-General was worried about climate change? Those who support a carbon tax do so because they believe the survival of the human species is at stake. The Governor-General could well decide that action against climate change was more important than democratic constitutional conventions, in the same way that the Liberals in 1975 decided that getting rid of the Whitlam Government was more important than respecting the result of the 1974 election.
The carbon tax may well be repealed without such drama. But there are many other scenarios which could demonstrate the contradictions in our Constitution; particularly if a hostile Senate is elected in 2016. Some are set out in Appendix 1. Many issues - refugees and terrorism, for example - have potential to inflame political debate sufficiently to induce our politicians and their supporters to adopt extreme or intransigent positions. All that is required to expose the flaws in our Constitution is for one side to play by the written rules, where the Crown’s representative holds ultimate power. It then becomes apparent that, contrary to popular understanding, the monarchy is not merely a benign irrelevance. It retains considerable power, available to be used not by the Queen herself but by those who wish to manipulate the monarchy’s remnant powers for their own political gain.
We should not wait to see whether a crisis develops. Crises are inevitable. We should act now to resolve which set of rules will apply when a crisis does emerge.
The need to take this sensible precaution casts the debate over an Australian republic in a new light. From the time Prime Minister Keating raised the republican issue in the early 1990s, the debate has been limited to two issues: who the head of state should be, and how that person should be chosen. The timidity of this mainstream republican proposal has been matched by the timidity of its promotion.
The republicans have overlooked the real issue with the head of state - the role and powers of the position. We cannot determine who should do the job, or the method of selecting a suitable person, until we define the job we want done. The role we define will suggest a method of selection.
Mainstream republicans have ignored the real flaws in our Constitution and the extent to which they stem from its monarchical foundations. Under our Constitution, the British monarch and the Governor-General have certain powers. Most republican proposals contemplate a president of some kind just taking over these powers.
This assumes that it is necessary for someone to exercise these powers. The assumption is wrong. Of the powers currently vested in the Queen or the Governor-General, many can simply be abolished. The remainder would be better exercised by our House of Representatives, or the Government it appoints, or the presiding officer in the House of Representatives.
It is not just the Queen who is redundant. The position of president which most republicans propose is entirely unnecessary. A substitute monarch is as useless as a real King or Queen.
Most Australians already want to sever our Constitutional ties to the British monarchy. They are right to regard the connection as having ceased to make sense a long time ago. Appointing our own Head of State is partly about Australia growing up and making its own decisions.
But republicanism should be about a lot more than this. It should be about performing some vital, long-overdue renovations to our Constitution, to base it firmly on democratic principle instead of an outdated concept of monarchy. The prime focus should be removing the undemocratic written rules in our Constitution and replacing them with democratic rules which are clear and certain. That can only be done by removing the Crown.
It is time for Australia to reject the timidity which has infected the national mood over the last 20 years. In the 1890s, the best our so-called ‘founding fathers’ could do was to cut and paste parts of the British and American Constitutions. Now our so-called republicans propose mimicking other countries by appointing or electing a president.
We should not be content to copy other nations. A mature Australia should be capable of devising a newer, better system, before its old one disintegrates. The Advancing Democracy model would advance parliamentary democracy beyond that achieved elsewhere by systematically replacing monarchical sentiment with democratic principle.
It is time for Australia to lead the evolution of Parliamentary democracy.
Go to next chapter
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|
Chapter 1 - Why We Should Change Now
Australia should vote on a new proposal to reform the Commonwealth Constitution.
Our Constitution has major flaws. Its failure to guarantee democracy threatens the stability of our political system. We need a system resilient enough to deal with polarising issues such as climate change and refugees. Without change, our system is vulnerable.
The Advancing Democracy proposal aims to strengthen the Constitution through far-reaching changes which replace the monarchy with democratic principle, because the Crown is the main source of instability.
People like to believe that the Constitution has served us well in the past. Why should we fix it, if it isn’t broken? Even if you accept that erroneous view, it is simply negligent to do nothing. Your home may not be 'broken', but it will collapse eventually if you neglect the maintenance. Similarly, a Constitution which is not adapted to changing circumstances will fail when you most need it.
Our Constitution was built on a foundation which has been crumbling for years: the monarchy. It should have been based on the twin pillars of democracy and federalism. Instead, a third pillar - monarchy - dominates the text of the Constitution.
A Constitution is a set of rules for Government. The first requirement for any set of rules is that they be clear - everyone should know which rules apply and what they mean. Australia’s Constitution fails this basic test. Its great flaw is that it actually provides for two sets of rules, with one set contradicting the other. The written rules grant extensive powers to the Queen and her representative, the Governor-General, while in practice unwritten rules require these powers to be exercised by, or in accordance with the wishes of, the majority of our elected representatives.
Few members of the public understand just how vulnerable our system is. The people expect:
▸ That the party which wins a majority in the House of Representatives will form the Government,
▸ That the Government will govern, and
▸ That our elected representatives will decide what our laws will be.
These important rules are the essence of democracy. Yet they are all rules of practice - conventions of the Constitution. None of them appears in the written Constitution. Our Constitution allows these democratic rules to operate, but it does not guarantee that they will, and in fact it permits each of these rules to be broken. Either of two opposite results - democratic rule or undemocratic rule - is perfectly legal under our Constitution.
Australia has been fortunate. In all but one of the few political crises we have faced, our politicians have found it expedient or advantageous or appropriate to resolve the conflict by following the democratic unwritten rules. Disputes in 1916-17 (over conscription), 1931-32 (the depression), 1939-1940 (war-time defence) and 1949-51 (post-war reconstruction) are examples of highly contentious issues which were resolved by public support shifting decisively between political groups before the contradictions in the Constitution became apparent. That is why our Constitution appears to have worked well - underlying these disputes was a consensus about how the disputes should be resolved.
But sooner or later we will face a crisis where it suits one side to play by the rules as they’ve operated in practice, while it suits the other side to play by the quite different rules in the written Constitution. When this occurred in 1975 our system was seriously damaged. If it happens again, the system may well fracture, because there will be no consensus on how to resolve a serious political dispute.
The political climate since early 2010 has been very reminiscent of that of the mid 1970s. Many sections of society are in the sort of ugly, combative mood in which emotion overrides reason, and different opinions are barely tolerated. We are again approaching a time when it may suit one side to play by the written rules, instead of the unwritten rules.
Only this time it is the progressive side of politics which may find it advantageous to ignore the democratic rules.
Consider the controversy over the carbon tax. We now have a carbon tax, and a new Liberal Government pledged to remove it. Until 30th June 2014, that Government faces a hostile Senate, dominated by the Greens and Labor.
What would happen if the Senate refused to pass the 2014 budget unless the new Government reversed its stance on the carbon tax? This is a variation of what a conservative Senate did to the Whitlam Government in 1975. The tactic worked then. The Governor-General dismissed the Whitlam Government, even though it held a clear majority in the House of Representatives. Would the Governor-General dismiss an Abbott Government because it could not guarantee supply? There is a clear precedent for doing so.
Alternatively, the Liberals may, after 30th June, pass the legislation to repeal the tax. But it could not become law until the Governor-General assents to the legislation, and section 58 of the Constitution permits assent to be withheld. Would the Governor-General assent? It depends on who the Governor-General is. What if the incumbent had been replaced before the election by a pro-Green nominee, or if a new Governor-General was worried about climate change? Those who support a carbon tax do so because they believe the survival of the human species is at stake. The Governor-General could well decide that action against climate change was more important than democratic constitutional conventions, in the same way that the Liberals in 1975 decided that getting rid of the Whitlam Government was more important than respecting the result of the 1974 election.
The carbon tax may well be repealed without such drama. But there are many other scenarios which could demonstrate the contradictions in our Constitution; particularly if a hostile Senate is elected in 2016. Some are set out in Appendix 1. Many issues - refugees and terrorism, for example - have potential to inflame political debate sufficiently to induce our politicians and their supporters to adopt extreme or intransigent positions. All that is required to expose the flaws in our Constitution is for one side to play by the written rules, where the Crown’s representative holds ultimate power. It then becomes apparent that, contrary to popular understanding, the monarchy is not merely a benign irrelevance. It retains considerable power, available to be used not by the Queen herself but by those who wish to manipulate the monarchy’s remnant powers for their own political gain.
We should not wait to see whether a crisis develops. Crises are inevitable. We should act now to resolve which set of rules will apply when a crisis does emerge.
The need to take this sensible precaution casts the debate over an Australian republic in a new light. From the time Prime Minister Keating raised the republican issue in the early 1990s, the debate has been limited to two issues: who the head of state should be, and how that person should be chosen. The timidity of this mainstream republican proposal has been matched by the timidity of its promotion.
The republicans have overlooked the real issue with the head of state - the role and powers of the position. We cannot determine who should do the job, or the method of selecting a suitable person, until we define the job we want done. The role we define will suggest a method of selection.
Mainstream republicans have ignored the real flaws in our Constitution and the extent to which they stem from its monarchical foundations. Under our Constitution, the British monarch and the Governor-General have certain powers. Most republican proposals contemplate a president of some kind just taking over these powers.
This assumes that it is necessary for someone to exercise these powers. The assumption is wrong. Of the powers currently vested in the Queen or the Governor-General, many can simply be abolished. The remainder would be better exercised by our House of Representatives, or the Government it appoints, or the presiding officer in the House of Representatives.
It is not just the Queen who is redundant. The position of president which most republicans propose is entirely unnecessary. A substitute monarch is as useless as a real King or Queen.
Most Australians already want to sever our Constitutional ties to the British monarchy. They are right to regard the connection as having ceased to make sense a long time ago. Appointing our own Head of State is partly about Australia growing up and making its own decisions.
But republicanism should be about a lot more than this. It should be about performing some vital, long-overdue renovations to our Constitution, to base it firmly on democratic principle instead of an outdated concept of monarchy. The prime focus should be removing the undemocratic written rules in our Constitution and replacing them with democratic rules which are clear and certain. That can only be done by removing the Crown.
It is time for Australia to reject the timidity which has infected the national mood over the last 20 years. In the 1890s, the best our so-called ‘founding fathers’ could do was to cut and paste parts of the British and American Constitutions. Now our so-called republicans propose mimicking other countries by appointing or electing a president.
We should not be content to copy other nations. A mature Australia should be capable of devising a newer, better system, before its old one disintegrates. The Advancing Democracy model would advance parliamentary democracy beyond that achieved elsewhere by systematically replacing monarchical sentiment with democratic principle.
It is time for Australia to lead the evolution of Parliamentary democracy.
Go to next chapter
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