The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the House of Representatives.
Summoning Parliament
After any general election the Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return of the writs.
First session
The Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than six months after the establishment of the Commonwealth.

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[Deleted. Sections 5 and 6 will be replaced with proposed s.6A:

6A Sessions of Parliament
The timing and conduct of sessions of each house of Parliament shall be determined by the standing orders made pursuant to section 50, provided that such standing orders must provide:
(a) That after any general election of members of the house, each house must convene a session not less than 30 days after the date appointed for the declaration of the results of the election; and
(b) That each house must convene a session at least once in each year, so that twelve months does not elapse between the last sitting of the last session and the first sitting of the next session.]

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The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the House of Representatives.
Summoning Parliament
After any general election the Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return of the writs.
First session
The Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than six months after the establishment of the Commonwealth.

5.1 This section and the related s.6 are to be deleted.
5.2 Control over when Parliament meets is to be determined by each House itself under a new s.6A and an amended s.50, which deals with standing orders.
5.3 Control over dissolutions of the House of Representatives will no longer be vested in the Governor-General, whether acting with the advice of the Prime Minister or against it. Only the House itself may resolve to hold an election: see proposed s.58A(iii), unless it has exceeded the limit of the 3 year term in s.28 or failed to appoint a Prime Minister within 60 days of the necessity arising.
5.4 Presently it is unclear whether ss.5 and 28 are the sole source of the Governor-General’s power to dissolve Parliament. Traditionally the dissolution of Parliament was part of the prerogative power of the Crown, and some argue that this may still influence the statutory powers of dissolution given in the Constitution: see Professor Pat Lane’s article, “Double Dissolution of Federal Parliament” (1973) 47 ALJ 290 at 300-301, with the effect that the Governor-General may decline to dissolve Parliament even when the Crown’s Ministers advise a dissolution. Such an interpretation is untenable, but why should it be a matter of debate when we can set clear rules? The Advancing Democracy model will sweep away the Crown and its prerogatives - see proposed s.62B - and set strict limits on when the House of Representatives may be dissolved.