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Chapter 3 - The Advancing Democracy Model |
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Chapter 3 - The Advancing Democracy Model
This chapter describes in principle how the proposed model would remove from our Constitution the features most likely to cause political instability. The precise amendments proposed to implement the model are set out in the Proposed Constitution section of this site.
Design of the model flows directly from the flaw identified in Chapter 1 - that a failure to guarantee democracy results in political instability. The ill-defined powers of the Crown must be replaced by clear, democratic rules. This necessitates a re-consideration of the role of a Head of State.
The Advancing Democracy Model
1. The Head of State, who will be called the Governor-General of Parliament, will be a symbol of unity, above party politics. The role will be discharged through the performance of a real job, rather than through merely ceremonial functions.
2. The role of the Head of State will be strictly limited. The principal duties and powers under proposed section 58A will be:
(a) The powers of the Speaker to preside over the House of Representatives, in accordance with such Standing Orders as the House determines by majority vote, and to manage debates within the House subject to the will of a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives. The Head of State would not, however, be regarded as a Member of the House of Representatives.
(b) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister, but only in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the House of Representatives.
(c) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and call elections, but only when the House of Representatives by simple majority requests such a dissolution, or the House fails for 60 days to appoint a Prime Minister, or the High Court, on application by the Head of State or any elector, declares that Parliament has sat for longer than the period permitted by the Constitution.
(d) The duty to convene sittings of Parliament in accordance with Standing Orders, or when the High Court, on application by the Head of State or any elector, declares that such sittings are necessary to comply with the Constitution.
(e) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are presently in the Constitution or which are from time to time conferred by legislation.
The Head of State would not be a president, either in name or function. He or she will be the Governor-General of Parliament; someone who can ensure that Parliament functions as it should.
3. Of the present powers of the Queen and Governor-General:
(a) Powers in relation to the formation of the Government, and elections for the House of Representatives, will be transferred to the House of Representatives - see proposed sections 64A and 58A(iii)(a).
(b) Powers of an executive nature will be transferred to the elected Government - see proposed sections 61A and 63A. The Head of State would not exercise governmental functions on the advice of his or her Ministers. The Prime Minister and Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister would exercise those powers directly.
(c) The power to assent to legislation, reserve powers and prerogative powers not elsewhere defined in the Constitution will be abolished.
4. There will be a Deputy Head of State, who would have the following powers under proposed s.59A:
(a) The powers of the Senate President to preside over the Senate, in accordance with such Standing Orders as the Senate determines by majority vote, and to manage debates within the Senate subject to the will of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The Deputy Head of State would not, however, be regarded as a Senator.
(b) The powers presently held by the Governor-General in relation to Senate elections and casual vacancies.
(c) The power to act in the place of the Head of State in the latter’s absence.
5. Each House of Parliament will retain the power to appoint one or more of its members to chair debates in the absence of the Head of State or the Deputy, and may make laws for appointing an acting Head of State - see proposed s.60B(1).
6. The Head of State will be appointed and dismissed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives - proposed s.58B. The Deputy will be appointed and dismissed by a two-thirds majority of the Senate - proposed s.59B.
7. The connection between the British monarchy and the States will be severed by a new provision in the Commonwealth Constitution authorising the Head of State of the Commonwealth to appoint and dismiss the Governor of a State if the Constitution of that State provides for appointment and dismissal by the Queen - see proposed s.110A. This new provision will, in respect of any State which votes in favour of the referendum, override any contrary provision of the State Constitutions pursuant to section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution.
Implications of the Model for Future Governance
The restrictions on the Head of State’s powers to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to dissolve Parliament would prevent a recurrence of the 1975 crisis, while leaving the Senate's powers intact. This is the main purpose of the proposal.
The clarification of the powers of the Head of State would remove the uncertainty which arises from that person having written powers which are usually but not always exercised in accordance with unwritten conventions.
The Head of State’s role as a unifying force above party politics would be exemplified by his or her impartial conduct of Parliamentary proceedings.
The Head of State would have greater power to control Parliamentary debate than the present Speaker, because:
▸ He or she would be seen to be impartial;
▸ The Governor-General’s rulings during debates could only be overridden by a two thirds majority; and
▸ Failure to obey certain rulings would result in Ministers and Members forfeiting a part of their salary - see the changes proposed to s.50, described in Chapter 5.
Abuse of Parliament by the Executive would be curtailed. Parliamentary behaviour would improve and the status of Parliament would be enhanced.
The reduction in, and codification of, the Head of State’s powers make it unnecessary and undesirable for selection by direct election. The more limited role of the Governor-General and Deputy of presiding over Parliamentary debate justifies the appointees being selected by each House of Parliament.
The requirement for a two-thirds majority is the best guarantee of the impartiality of the person selected. The ability of the Prime Minister to appoint a ‘tame’ Governor-General, a largely unrecognised feature of the present Constitution, would disappear.
The constitutional connection between the monarchy and States voting in favour of the referendum would be automatically severed at the same time as the connection between the Commonwealth and the monarchy. States may then proceed with further updates of their Constitutions as appropriate.
The remaining chapters examine different aspects of the above proposal in more detail, demonstrating its superiority over current arrangements.
Go to next chapter |
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Chapter 3 - The Advancing Democracy Model
This chapter describes in principle how the proposed model would remove from our Constitution the features most likely to cause political instability. The precise amendments proposed to implement the model are set out in the Proposed Constitution section of this site.
Design of the model flows directly from the flaw identified in Chapter 1 - that a failure to guarantee democracy results in political instability. The ill-defined powers of the Crown must be replaced by clear, democratic rules. This necessitates a re-consideration of the role of a Head of State.
The Advancing Democracy Model
1. The Head of State, who will be called the Governor-General of Parliament, will be a symbol of unity, above party politics. The role will be discharged through the performance of a real job, rather than through merely ceremonial functions.
2. The role of the Head of State will be strictly limited. The principal duties and powers under proposed section 58A will be:
(a) The powers of the Speaker to preside over the House of Representatives, in accordance with such Standing Orders as the House determines by majority vote, and to manage debates within the House subject to the will of a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives. The Head of State would not, however, be regarded as a Member of the House of Representatives.
(b) The duty to appoint and remove the Prime Minister, but only in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the House of Representatives.
(c) The duty to dissolve the House of Representatives and call elections, but only when the House of Representatives by simple majority requests such a dissolution, or the House fails for 60 days to appoint a Prime Minister, or the High Court, on application by the Head of State or any elector, declares that Parliament has sat for longer than the period permitted by the Constitution.
(d) The duty to convene sittings of Parliament in accordance with Standing Orders, or when the High Court, on application by the Head of State or any elector, declares that such sittings are necessary to comply with the Constitution.
(e) Such other powers not inconsistent with the above as are presently in the Constitution or which are from time to time conferred by legislation.
The Head of State would not be a president, either in name or function. He or she will be the Governor-General of Parliament; someone who can ensure that Parliament functions as it should.
3. Of the present powers of the Queen and Governor-General:
(a) Powers in relation to the formation of the Government, and elections for the House of Representatives, will be transferred to the House of Representatives - see proposed sections 64A and 58A(iii)(a).
(b) Powers of an executive nature will be transferred to the elected Government - see proposed sections 61A and 63A. The Head of State would not exercise governmental functions on the advice of his or her Ministers. The Prime Minister and Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister would exercise those powers directly.
(c) The power to assent to legislation, reserve powers and prerogative powers not elsewhere defined in the Constitution will be abolished.
4. There will be a Deputy Head of State, who would have the following powers under proposed s.59A:
(a) The powers of the Senate President to preside over the Senate, in accordance with such Standing Orders as the Senate determines by majority vote, and to manage debates within the Senate subject to the will of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The Deputy Head of State would not, however, be regarded as a Senator.
(b) The powers presently held by the Governor-General in relation to Senate elections and casual vacancies.
(c) The power to act in the place of the Head of State in the latter’s absence.
5. Each House of Parliament will retain the power to appoint one or more of its members to chair debates in the absence of the Head of State or the Deputy, and may make laws for appointing an acting Head of State - see proposed s.60B(1).
6. The Head of State will be appointed and dismissed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives - proposed s.58B. The Deputy will be appointed and dismissed by a two-thirds majority of the Senate - proposed s.59B.
7. The connection between the British monarchy and the States will be severed by a new provision in the Commonwealth Constitution authorising the Head of State of the Commonwealth to appoint and dismiss the Governor of a State if the Constitution of that State provides for appointment and dismissal by the Queen - see proposed s.110A. This new provision will, in respect of any State which votes in favour of the referendum, override any contrary provision of the State Constitutions pursuant to section 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution.
Implications of the Model for Future Governance
The restrictions on the Head of State’s powers to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to dissolve Parliament would prevent a recurrence of the 1975 crisis, while leaving the Senate's powers intact. This is the main purpose of the proposal.
The clarification of the powers of the Head of State would remove the uncertainty which arises from that person having written powers which are usually but not always exercised in accordance with unwritten conventions.
The Head of State’s role as a unifying force above party politics would be exemplified by his or her impartial conduct of Parliamentary proceedings.
The Head of State would have greater power to control Parliamentary debate than the present Speaker, because:
▸ He or she would be seen to be impartial;
▸ The Governor-General’s rulings during debates could only be overridden by a two thirds majority; and
▸ Failure to obey certain rulings would result in Ministers and Members forfeiting a part of their salary - see the changes proposed to s.50, described in Chapter 5.
Abuse of Parliament by the Executive would be curtailed. Parliamentary behaviour would improve and the status of Parliament would be enhanced.
The reduction in, and codification of, the Head of State’s powers make it unnecessary and undesirable for selection by direct election. The more limited role of the Governor-General and Deputy of presiding over Parliamentary debate justifies the appointees being selected by each House of Parliament.
The requirement for a two-thirds majority is the best guarantee of the impartiality of the person selected. The ability of the Prime Minister to appoint a ‘tame’ Governor-General, a largely unrecognised feature of the present Constitution, would disappear.
The constitutional connection between the monarchy and States voting in favour of the referendum would be automatically severed at the same time as the connection between the Commonwealth and the monarchy. States may then proceed with further updates of their Constitutions as appropriate.
The remaining chapters examine different aspects of the above proposal in more detail, demonstrating its superiority over current arrangements.
Go to next chapter |
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